Deep neural networks(DNNs) are widely used in AI-controlled Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) to controll cars, robotics, water treatment plants and railways. However, DNNs have vulnerabilities to well-designed input samples that are called adversarial examples. Adversary attack is one of the important techniques for detecting and improving the security of neural networks. Existing attacks, including state-of-the-art black-box attack have a lower success rate and make invalid queries that are not beneficial to obtain the direction of generating adversarial examples. For these reasons, this paper proposed a CMA-ES-based adversarial attack on black-box DNNs. Firstly, an efficient method to reduce the number of invalid queries is introduced. Secondly, a black-box attack of generating adversarial examples to fit a high-dimensional independent Gaussian distribution of the local solution space is proposed. Finally, a new CMA-based perturbation compression method is applied to make the process of reducing perturbation smoother. Experimental results on ImageNet classifiers show that the proposed attack has a higher success-rate than the state-of-the-art black-box attack but reduce the number of queries by 30% equally.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence techniques are increasingly applied to decision-making problems in Cyber-Physical Systems, such as robotics, autonomous vehicles, chemical plants, etc. Deep neural networks (DNNs) constitute a typical method for the core of AI system. However, ongoing research has revealed a series of security issues in DNNs [1] . There are two main approaches that an attacker can follow to mislead a DNN. In the first, the adversary launches an attack during the DNN testing/deployment stage. The attacker can tamper only with the system's input data after the victim DNN model has been trained. The attacker may have information about the DNN training models but cannot modify them. The second approach is to ''poison'' a DNN training data set by feeding adversarial information to the DNN classifier [2] - [4] .
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As DNNs-based systems become increasingly popular and widely deployed, it is necessary to address and mitigate these risks to make systems robust and socially accepted.
DNNs have vulnerabilities to well-designed input samples that are called adversarial examples. In recent years, scholars have developed a number of methods for generating adversarial examples. Preliminary researches on the robustness of DNNs focused on an white-box setting, while the network model is transparent that allows full access during the attack process [5] - [7] . When the attackers are able to perform back propagation, many gradient descent algorithms are proposed to compute gradient of the output with respect to the input of the targeted DNN. For example, Deep-Fool [2] , JSMA [8] , C&W [9] , FGSM [10] , I-FGSM [11] , MI-FGSM [12] , and R-FGSM [13] are white box attacks. However, most real world applications do not allow the access of their internal network structure and parameters, so the white-box attacks cannot be applied in many cases. An black-box attack setting does not require to access the model's internal configurations, which assumes that the attacker can access the input and output of a DNN by generating queries continuously. In a black box attack environment, there are alternative model attacks [14] - [16] , one-pixel attacks [17] , decision-based attacks [18] , NES+PGD [19] and so on. In response to such attacks, scholars have also found some defense methods against the adversarial example, such as adversarial training [13] , defense distillation [20] , adversarial example detection [21] - [23] , GAN-based defense [24] and dynamic defense. To make the neural network more robust to the adversarial attack, the adversarial training [10] , [25] are introduced to increases robustness by augmenting training data with adversarial examples generating by the integrated attack methods.
Attack efficiency is an essential attribute for an attack approach, because there are time and query limits in most cases. Generally, the highly efficient attacks have more chance to succeed without detection by the adversary.
To attack the black box model, we can only use the image to query the classification model and then obtain the top K labels and the confidence corresponding to the input image. This setting is called the local information setting [19] , [26] , [27] . We define that all queries that make the targeted classification not in the top K categories are invalid queries. The main reason for this definition is that if the targeted classification of the query is not in the top K categories, we will not be able to obtain its confidence. Consequently, we cannot calculate its cross entropy and cross-entropy gradient, and we cannot estimate it by NES [28] . Moreover, it is imperative for an attacker to obtain the gradient [29] , [30] . The gradient here refers to the generalized gradient. In other words, when the query is invalid, we can hardly use the query results to obtain a modification direction that is beneficial to for the targeted classification.
At present, there are a few of black box attack methods that have noticed the problem of invalid queries, for example, NES+PGD [19] and decision-based attack [18] . Both methods start the attack by inputting two images simultaneously: one original image and one target image. To improve the efficiency of the black box query, they all start the attack by adding disturbances near the target image because it is high possible for the samples near the target image to be classified as a target classification. Their method does significantly reduce the number of invalid queries in the early stages of the attack. However, in the later stages of the attack, as the adversarial images move closer to the original image, invalid queries begin to appear and hinder the progress of the adversarial attack [31] - [33] .
Invalid queries have become the primary factor hindering black box attacks. We conducted a reproduced experiment on NES+PGD [19] and found that every time that invalid queries appeared, the attack speed decreased. Obviously, the appearance of invalid queries will waste a vast quantity of queries. It is observed that the program appears to become lost in the queries, and the program will become stuck in an endless loop and even obtain worse results than before [34] - [36] .
To solve this problem of invalid querying under the local information setting, we proposes a practical valid-query positioning algorithm that is based on the covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) [37] , which we called the valid evolution algorithm. Moreover, this paper presents the adversarial example generation algorithm and perturbation compression algorithm corresponding for the valid evolution.
We provide the following main contributions: 1) Proposing the concept of an invalid query. Moreover, we provide an efficient solution to generate valid queries, that makes the attack process of querying the classifier more efficient than NES+PGD [19] .
2)Verifying that the local solution space of adversarial examples obeys a high-dimensional independent Gaussian distribution. Based on this, a new black box attack scheme is proposed.
3)Providing a new perturbation compression method -CMA-based perturbation compression scheme. This method can make the perturbation compression process smoother, and the perturbation result is more difficult to identify by the naked eye.
II. APPROACH A. VALID EVOLUTION
The evolutionary strategy algorithm is mainly used as a method to solve the parameter optimization problem, which imitates the principle of biological evolution. In other words, it will repeat the interaction of mutation, including recombination and mutation, and selection. In each generation, we generate new individual by the random variation of the current parent individual, than we let the better child individuals become the parents of next generation based on their fitness or objective function values. The evolutionary strategy is sampling new candidate individuals according to the multivariate normal distribution in R n randomly, recalculating the mean and variance of better child individuals, and then retaining better individuals and its distribution with the better fitness values. Recombination is equivalent to selecting a new average for the distribution. A mutation is equivalent to adding a random vector with a perturbation of zero mean. The interdependencies between variables in a distribution are represented by a covariance matrix.
An obvious shortcoming of simple evolution strategies is that the noise parameters of the standard deviation are fixed. CMA-ES, Covariance Matrix Adaptation-evolution strategy, can fine-tune parameters around an optimal value to explore more possibilities and increase the standard deviation of the search space. CMA-ES can get the results of each generation, and adapt to increase or decrease the scope of the next generation search. It not only adjusts the adaptability, but also calculates the covariance matrix of the entire parameter space. In each generation, CMA-ES provides a multivariate, normally distributed parameter for the next generation of sampling. Because CMA-ES can adjust its mean and variance simultaneously using the information of the optimal solution, it can expand the search range when the optimal solution distance is far away, or narrow the search range when the optimal solution is very close.
Normally, we use a Gaussian distribution to represent an unknown random variable. Gaussian distributions are often used to represent real-valued random variables whose distributions are not known, we assume that the perturbation quantity δ of the adversarial example (or valid sample) is also a random variable that conforms to a Gaussian distribution.
Suppose that the hypothesis is established, we can use CMA to search valid samples or generate adversarial examples. A simplified expression of valid evolution is shown in Figure 1 .
Essentially, valid evolution is a method to locate the distribution of valid samples. When we get a small number of samples of valid queries, for example, two or more, we can calculate the mean and standard deviation from these valid samples, and then we use the updated Gaussian distribution to regenerate the samples. According to our hypothesis, the probability of a valid sample in the newly generated samples is higher, and this is also verified in the subsequent experiment. We will efficiently locate the distribution of valid samples and find more valid samples by implementing this process.
We can consider an image to be a high-dimensional vector X (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), which can be expressed as SourceImage + δ. Additionally, we assume that δ ∼ N (µ, σ ), where µ is the expectation of perturbations, µ(µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ n ), and σ is the standard deviation of perturbations, σ (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n ). The distribution of perturbations is
The evolution formula is
B. HOW TO OBTAIN INITIAL VALID SAMPLES
NES+PGD [19] to obtain valid samples by adding perturbations around the target image. Unfortunately, this method is not suitable for CMA valid evolution. The reason is that CMA valid evolution needs few initial valid samples. In other words, we do not need to obtain too many initial valid samples. Meanwhile, the more dispersed the valid samples are, the more convenient valid evolution will be. In summary, we provide a more efficient way to obtain initial valid queries for later evolution.
We input the original image and the target image to find a middle image between the original image and the target image, and it is easy to find a small number of valid samples near the middle image. which is
We use the projection method to find this middle image. Specifically, we project the target image onto the original image. With increasing projection rate, the probability of finding valid samples around the middle image will be higher. In this way, it is possible to quickly find a vast quantity of valid samples and its distribution with a smaller L 2 distance from the original image, which we called the valid population. Compared to starting from the target image directly, starting from the middle image can save much overhead. We call this method target-approaching projection, and its effect is shown in Figure 2 .
The implementation of valid evolution are shown in Table 1 . The standard deviation σ of the initial perturbation is a hyperparameter, and its effect will be specifically discussed in the fourth section.
In the actual experiment, the Gaussian perturbation added does not conform to the standard Gaussian distribution N(0, 1). This is because we usually normalize the pixel value range from the discrete value of [0,255] to the continuous value of [0,1]. In the field of images, we usually add a perturbation of N (0, 0.001), that is, the range of the disturbance is within about 0.2 gradations. This is to ensure that the samples we found have a small disturbance. However, if the disturbance range is too small, it will result in the following two problems: 1). The population diversity found is poor. The population diffusion is slow when we use CMA evolution. The reason of that is the evolution of σ is slow, which leads to the slow evolution of the CMA algorithm; 2). It is difficult to find a StartPoint which is close to the SourceImage. We solve this problem by using a method of diffusion Gaussian perturbation combined with a close target projection method. After we get an intermediate image, we gradually expand the standard deviation σ of the Gaussian perturbation model. The radius of the three circles are respectively 1x, 2x, and 3x of the σ in the Gaussian distribution. After perturbation compression, the perturbation's center will be closer to original image than before. Additionally, if we find some valid samples, CMA will escape the local optimum. If we can't find a valid sample after expanding to a certain limit, we move the StartPoint. This allows us to obtain an initial valid sample within suitable σ .
C. CMA EVOLVE VALID POPULATION
To find the ideal adversarial example whose perturbation is as small as possible and to make the target classification confidence higher, our optimized objective function is defined as follows:
The loss function can represent the difference between the current output and the expected output. The smaller the loss function is, the better it is. Moreover, the objective function is also an individual fitness evaluation function Fitness().
Essentially, CMA is a method to minimize our objective function.
For example, we use a Gaussian distribution with the expectation and standard deviation to generate the population, calculate the fitness of all individuals, and then select individuals with better fitness to recalculate the expectation and standard deviation. The cycle will continue until the desired solution is found. The evolution formula is as follows:
where N better refers to the number of good perturbations that we obtain. In our experiment, the number of N better is set as a quarter of the individuals.
D. PERTURBATION COMPRESSION
There are two important parameters in the evolutionary algorithm that determine the direction of evolutionary search, one is the search breadth, and the other is the search depth. CMA is an excellent algorithm that adaptively adjusts the ratio of two search directions. When searching for extreme points, it automatically shrinks the standard deviation, which FIGURE 6. Queries/convergence threshold (CGTD). This figure shows the influence of CGTD on attack performance. According to this figure, we find that it is enough for CGTD to take a value of 0.15. In other words, we can consider that we become caught by the local optimum if the difference between the last two iterations' fitness is less than 0.15. improves the search depth and reduces the search breadth. When the search population does not concentrate on a trend near a certain point, it automatically expands the standard deviation, thereby increasing the search breadth and reducing the search depth. However, as the Gaussian model only fits the distribution model of the local adversarial example, the CMA is very likely to fall into a local optimum. We need to find some new valid samples with a smaller L 2 distance to escape the local optimum.
There are two main problems needed to be solved in CMA-based disturbance compression: 1). When we perform disturbance compression. 2). How to perform adaptive disturbance compression. We find that when the CMA evolutionary valid population reaches the local optimal solution, and the perturbation samples classified as the target classification in high confidence, we should perform perturbation compression. Because at this time, the CMA no longer needs to evolve. Most of the disturbances near the disturbance center can make the classifier error. We have found best solution 286). The middle picture is recognized as a long-tailed monkey (370) by Inception V3, which required 37,850 queries, whose perturbation L 2 distance is 24.9818. The right picture is recognized as a go-kart (570), which required 509,500 queries, whose perturbation L 2 distance is 25.9608.
in current context, and we need to perform the disturbance compression to jump out of the current local optimal solution. However, there is also a case when the CMA evolutionary valid population reaches the local optimal solution, but the perturbation sample cannot be classified as the target classification with high confidence. This may be due to the fact that the CMA algorithm converges too fast, so that a good local optimal solution is missed during evolution. At this point, we solve this problem by increasing the perturbation standard deviation and reusing the CMA to evolve the valid sample distribution.
Sequentially, we attempt to find a valid sample with a small L 2 distance by moving the perturbation center closer to the original image. When the search finds a locally optimal solution, we move the perturbation expectation according to the adaptive proportion, and the standard deviation is designed to be 1/3 of the expected value according to the 3σ principle. The main reason of this design is ensuring that the valid sample will be found after approaching, whose L 2 distance is smaller than the original distribution sample. If we do not find a valid sample, then we reduce the proportion until we find a small number of valid samples, as shown in figure 3 .
Another important aspect is we need to know when we need to execute the perturbation compression, and when the local optimum is found. We designed two hyperparameters, convergence threshold (CGTD) and confidence threshold (CFTD), the specific settings are as follows:
The specific parameters are discussed in Part 3. 
III. PARAMETER TUNNING
In this section, we will describe the influences of different hyperparameters for the experiment. In detail, we select a pair of source and target images in ImgNet randomly, execute three times adversarial example generation tasks using the different hyperparameters and use the average number of queries as the criterion for evaluating the parameters. This paper uses the controlling variable method to discuss the influence of each parameter on the actual performance. The default experiment parameters are shown in Table 2 .
When we solidify CGTD and CFTD, we let the standard deviation of the initial perturbation σ as a variable. Then we find that the experiment has the best performance when σ is 0.05. Additionally, when σ is greater than 0.16, the attack frequently fails. The primary reason is that the perturbation range is too extensive to find valid samples, even around the target image, which as shown in figure 4 .
When we solidify σ and CFTD, we let the convergence threshold (CGTD) as a variable. Then we find the experimental performance is the best when CGTD is 0.15. Additionally, once the CGTD is higher than 0.15, as the value of CGTD increases, there is no significant change in the number of queries required for the attack. The reason for this result is CFTD becomes the primary factor that limits the perturbation compression, as shown in figure 5 .
When we solidify σ and CGTD, we let the confidence threshold (CFTD) as a variable. Then we find that the number of queries is decreasing as CFTD increases. However, when CFTD is approaching 1, we can't complete the attack, and the number of queries begins to increase drastically, which infer there is a bottleneck in the confidence of adversarial examples. Therefore, based on the experimental results, we recommend that the CFTD should be assigned less than 0.9 and higher than 0.6, as shown in figure 6 .
IV. EVALUATION
This paper focuses on generating adversarial examples for the black box model under the local information setting. We will compare the attack performance of CMA attack and NES+PGD [19] attack in different ways.
The specifics of our experiment are we will use the two attack methods to perform 10 * 10 cyclic adversarial example generation tasks simultaneously. The results are shown in Table 3 . As shown, the NES attack stops once the L ∞ distance is less than or equal to 0.05. The success rate of the NES attack in this experiment is 95%. In detail, there are two failures and three results can be detected by the naked eye. The average target classification confidence of adversarial examples generated by the NES attack reached 89.2%, which is a very high value, and the average number of queries was 114,859. The NES [19] stated that the average number of queries required is 104,342. Our experimental results are similar to their reported result, so the comparative experiments have credibility.
Similarly, in the 10 * 10 cyclic adversarial example generation tasks, we stopped attacking once the L 2 distance was less than 0.05 * √ ImageSize, which is the similar condition to L 2 distance less than 0.05. In this paper, Imagesize = 299 * 299 * 3, and our attack success rate reached 100%. Additionally, the average target classification confidence reached 73.6%, and the average number of queries was 74948. In fact, to guarantee the success rate, we made a compromise on the number of queries. We have increased the upper limit of the number of queries such that it leads to the existence of adversarial examples that have inquired for more than 500,000 queries. However, even so, our method reduces the average number of queries by 30% compared to NES attacks. The reason for this result is that the majority of our adversarial examples only need a few queries. According to statistics, the median queries of CMA is 37850. Compared with NES's result, CMA reduces the queries at least 60%.
According to Figure 7 , most of the attacks based on NES+PGD require less than 150,000 queries, and a few need more than 200,000 queries. The majority of the attacks based on CMA require 100,000 queries, and a few need more than 100,000 queries. Comparing NES and CMA, we found that the main reason for the decrease in attack speed is the decrease in the rate of valid queries for NES attacks, and it is mainly because the perturbation compression direction is opposite to the evolution direction for CMA attacks.
However, the intermediate results can already lead to the model's mis-classification, while human identification is correct, and the naked eye has difficultly in distinguishing the perturbations, as shown in Figure 8 . We find that although some images do not meet the specified L 2 distance requirements, the perturbations are hard to identify by the naked eye. Figure 9 presents the L 2 distance distribution of adversarial examples obtained by NES and CMA attacks. Apparently, the L 2 distance of adversarial examples generated by CMA is more concentrated, and the average L 2 distance of the CMA adversarial examples is lower than that of NES. As shown in figure 11 , it is evident that the adversarial examples generated by CMA are smoother and more challenging to find by the naked eye.
Moreover, we investigated the feasibility of valid evolution algorithms. We design the 10 * 10 cyclic valid example generation task, which uses the valid evolution algorithm to find the distribution of valid examples. The experimental results are shown in Figure 10 and Table 4 . We find that our method can find the initial valid samples with a 100% success rate, and only a few initial valid samples, for example,the number of valid sample is 3, can quickly locate a group of valid samples, which is referred to as 50. In the experiment, we found that as the number of valid samples increased, the next iteration of valid samples will increase faster, which is a virtuous circle.
At the end of the evaluation, we demonstrate the influence of valid rate on attack performance, which is shown in figure 12. Every time that the valid rate decreases, the attack will stop. We find that if the valid rate of NES is decreasing, the L 2 distance of NES will be horizontal. The basis of this result is estimating the gradient needs enough valid samples. For instance, NES attack needs 200 valid samples every epoch, and CMA attack needs 50 valid samples every epoch. However, for CMA, we will accumulate all the valid samples that have already been found. Additionally, if we obtain 50 valid samples, we can continue attacking. Therefore, it is vital for the attacking epoch to obtain enough valid samples.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
For the black-box attack, the invalid queries are not beneficial to generate the adversarial examples. We proposed an efficient way to reduce invalid queries, so our CMA-based attack has the higher success rate and smaller perturbation comparing to the existing NES-based attack. However, there is a limitation of our approach, which is we still require to query the targeted model a larger number of times. On the other hand, our method can greatly improve the query efficiency, it can be applied to other black-box attacks by using the valid evolution to boost the attack performance.
At the same time, we recommend using the proposed L 2 perturbation adaptive scaling compression method in the perturbation compression part. Compared to using L ∞ projections, our perturbation compression method can get the smaller perturbations so the generated examples appear to be more difficult for the naked eye to discern.
To further improve the exploring performance of the evolutionary strategy-based black-box attacks, the future work may includes: 1). There may be a straightforward way to get the two input images for generating adversarial examples, because in our experiments we found that when the original image and the target image are determined, the number of queries required to generate the adversarial example is basically fixed using the same method twice. And the experiment also shows that the two candidate pairs of input original image and target one may have huge difference of querying numbers.
2). The research on neural network model defense may be extended to mitigate the evolutionary strategy-based black-box attacks. To make the attack more powerful, it may requires to reduce the number of inquiries of the black-box model dramatically and evade the defense but detecting the decision boundary between classes efficiently. We assume that the dynamic defense based on randomness can also be broken through entirely by computing its variance and mean through multiple queries such that statistical methods can be used against random-based defenses.
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